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In the wake of the July 2003 Australian-led intervention in Solomon 
Islands, a debate has surfaced in the media and in academic circles regard-
ing whether or not Solomon Islands was a “failed state.” New Zealand 
academic Ross McDonald and journalist Michael Field have argued that 
the failed state brand exaggerated the level of ethnic unrest in an otherwise 
peaceful archipelago comprised of tight-knit communities (pfnet / pina 
Nius 2003; Field 2003). Conversely, while acknowledging that the “petri-
dish for transnational threats” metaphor is unhelpful and overstated (see 
Wainwright 2003, 13), Jon Fraenkel from the University of the South 
Pacifi c has claimed that Solomon Islands was overall a failed (or at least 
failing) state before the intervention (quoted in pfnet / pina Nius 2003). 
Still others have pointed out the links between the timing of the interven-
tion and Australian big-picture foreign policy imperatives, such as national 
security and the alliance with the United States, which are essentially unre-
lated to Solomon Islands (Kabutaulaka 2005; Dinnen 2004). 
Despite this fl urry of commentary, there has been no sustained critical 
examination of the failed state concept itself or evaluation of its limita-
tions for explaining the confl ict in Solomon Islands and, consequently, 
the prospects of the intervention. It is precisely this gap that that I aim 
to address in this article, by exploring the problems associated with the 
failed states literature in general and its applicability to Solomon Islands 
in particular, and by providing an alternative framework from which to 
examine the roots and possible trajectories of confl ict in Solomon Islands. 
The urgency of such an undertaking has become sadly apparent with the 
eruption in April 2006 of violent protests in Honiara—a development that 
has undermined the intervention’s hitherto unblemished profi le in Aus-
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tralia.1 In light of these events the need to examine conventional wisdom 
about failed states is even more pressing.
Failed and failing states have become an increasingly central concern 
for the world’s most powerful states in the post–cold war period, particu-
larly since September 11. This focus represents a return of sorts to the 
cold-war blending of security and economic development, albeit with a 
distinctly neoliberal fl avor (Berger and Weber 2006, 202). The common 
conception of state failure cannot be understood in isolation from the 
political and ideological shifts toward neoliberalism that have taken place 
since the end of the cold war, alongside the deepening of processes associ-
ated with economic globalization. However, the impact of these changes 
on the ways in which state failure is understood is not acknowledged in 
most of the policy analyses of the intervention in Solomon Islands—or 
indeed in much of the literature on failed states, on which these analyses 
are based—which tend to view state failure as a measurable condition and 
as an ahistorical phenomenon. By framing state failure in terms of a lack 
of good governance and political will, the literature obscures the struc-
tural forces that generate the conditions that give rise to the symptoms of 
failure. This article is not concerned with historicizing and contextualizing 
depictions of failed states, though, because much has already been writ-
ten on this matter (Bilgin and Morton 2002). Rather, I hope to demon-
strate that without a more comprehensive understanding of the causes and 
dimensions of confl ict in Solomon Islands than that encapsulated in the 
failed state concept, the long-term viability of the intervention and future 
political stability in this Pacifi c archipelago state remain uncertain, as the 
April 2006 riots demonstrated.
Solomon Islands went through a diffi cult period between 1998 and 
2003. The crisis began in mid-1998 with skirmishes between an indige-
nous Guadalcanalese militia—the Isatabu Freedom Movement (ifm)—and 
Malaitan settlers (later organized in the Malaita Eagle Force—mef). It 
later evolved into a protracted period of low-level violence, intimidation, 
and general lawlessness. Overall, the crisis is estimated to have caused the 
displacement of 35,000 Solomon Islanders and the death of about 200. 
It has also devastated the economy, with the gross domestic product free-
falling 14 percent in 2000 and 9 percent in 2001.2 After rejecting earlier 
requests for assistance, the Australian government agreed in June 2003 
to accept then Solomon Islands Prime Minister Allan Kemakeza’s call for 
help and lead a Pacifi c Islands Forum intervention force designed, in Aus-
tralian Prime Minister John Howard’s words, to “arrest this downward 
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spiral, which, if not addressed, could result in the total collapse of the 
Solomon Islands’ governance and sovereignty. . . . A failed state would not 
only devastate the lives of the peoples of the Solomons but could also pose 
a signifi cant security risk for the whole region” (2003). 
Minh Nguyen has argued that this was the fi rst time an Australian gov-
ernment employed the prevention of state failure as a policy rationale. 
However, the term “failed state” had already been used extensively by 
other governments, most notably the United States and Britain, and in 
a rapidly growing body of literature (Nguyen 2005). Nguyen claimed 
that the Australian diagnosis of and responses to the situation in Solo-
mon Islands have been established to a large extent on preexisting theo-
retical and empirical knowledge on state failure and state building. This 
framework pertains to the particular form the Australian-led Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (ramsi) intervention has assumed 
by simultaneously providing the parameters for the very classifi cation of 
Solomon Islands as a failing or a failed state, the nature and scope of the 
threats associated with this condition, and the sort of strategies advocated 
to alleviate and prevent state failure. 
The literature views state failure primarily as a matter of governance, 
defi ned narrowly as “the exercise of power or authority—political, eco-
nomic, administrative or otherwise—to manage a country’s resources and 
affairs” (AusAID 2000, 3). Policy analysts and bureaucrats have argued 
that Solomon Islands, like other failed or failing states, has been suffer-
ing from endemic poor governance, marked by dysfunctional institutions, 
widespread corruption, a stagnating economy, and growing lawlessness 
(Wainwright 2003; dfat 2004). From such perspectives, because the 
state failed to provide basic political goods to the majority of the popu-
lace, it eventually lost authority and the country descended into chaos. 
In response, ramsi’s long-term goal, following the immediate targets of 
halting violence and restoring law and order, has been defi ned as promot-
ing good governance by helping Solomon Islanders rebuild their country’s 
institutions and institutional capacity and integrity. Good governance has 
also been seen as the key to the long-term sustainability of the economic 
reforms that ramsi initiated and to the stabilization of the security situa-
tion in a post-ramsi Solomon Islands (Warner 2004).
The persistence of poor governance in Solomon Islands is often explained 
as an outcome of the clash between strong premodern Melanesian institu-
tions—embodying traditional values—and weaker modern state institu-
tions, representing legal-rational modes of governance, in Max Weber’s 
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formulation (1978). Elsina Wainwright, whose June 2003 Australian Stra-
tegic Policy Institute report provided the blueprint for the intervention, 
argued that the weakness of state institutions is a result of the British 
protectorate administration’s lack of interest in state building during the 
colonial era (Wainwright 2003; see also dfat 2004). She argued that at 
independence in July 1978, the colonialists left the newborn state with a 
very weak and badly designed institutional framework for modern state-
hood. The situation was made worse because the state had to compete 
for legitimacy with powerful and well-entrenched premodern traditional 
institutions. This view is shared by many Solomon Islanders, including 
former Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni, who once famously said that 
Solomon Islands was “a state conceived but never born” (quoted in Wain-
wright 2003, 20). Others have gone so far as to argue that Melanesian 
culture is profoundly incompatible with the sort of institutions required 
for the proper functioning of a modern state in general and the Westmin-
ster system in particular (Turnbull 2002). The perception that traditional 
institutions and values have weakened the establishment and operation 
of the modern state, and therefore spurred the emergence and escalation 
of the confl ict in Solomon Islands, has contributed to ramsi’s top-down 
approach, which relies on the insertion of Australian personnel into most 
key positions in Solomon Islands public administration. Such actions are 
taken despite public declarations emphasizing the importance of indig-
enous ownership to the success of governance reforms. 
A number of critics, most notably Solomon Islands academic Tarcisius 
Tara Kabutaulaka, have questioned ramsi’s platform and its “state-cen-
tered” approach. Kabutaulaka made the important observation that in 
Solomon Islands there have always been signifi cant power bases outside 
the state, and because ramsi has not sought to engage these alternative 
and possibly useful sources of legitimate political power, it is breeding 
dependency. The key to sustainable indigenous governance in Solomon 
Islands, Kabutaulaka has argued, is a form of power sharing between the 
state and important societal institutions (2005). 
Despite the advances of this view over ramsi’s heavy emphasis on the 
state, it still remains constrained by a state–society binary (which reifi es a 
problematic distinction between traditional and modern institutions), and 
by a preoccupation with strengthening state capacity (viewed as an attri-
bute external to social and political relationships). Missing is a comprehen-
sive and systematic understanding of the development and dimensions of 
state power in Solomon Islands, addressing such basic questions as: What 
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interests support state power? Who exercises this power, and for whom? 
And in what ways can the intervention affect state power? Answering 
these questions requires a theorization of the relationship between confl ict, 
capitalist development, and state power in general and in the Solomon 
Islands context in particular. In this paper I draw on social confl ict theory 
to examine confl ict in relation to dynamic coalitions of interest struggling 
over the control and distribution of scarce state resources (see Hewison 
and others 1993). From this perspective the Solomon Islands confl ict, 
rather than representing a crisis of governance, is primarily explained by 
the growing marginalization of key interests in Solomon Islands society, 
resulting from a number of systemic challenges to the complex and dense 
patronage networks that hitherto worked to mitigate the effects of highly 
uneven economic development.
In the next section, I begin by providing a critical examination of the 
failed states literature, as well as of some of ramsi’s critics. In the subse-
quent two sections I present an alternative framework for understanding 
the confl ict in Solomon Islands, beginning with an analysis of governance 
and state power, followed by an examination of the confl ict’s main two 
stages. Ultimately, I argue that despite initial impressive successes in the 
area of law and order, ramsi’s pervasive reform and governance agenda 
exacerbates confl ict in Solomon Islands. This is because the neoliberal 
“good governance” model for economic development ramsi is seeking to 
implement generates dangerous and destabilizing social and political ten-
sions in Solomon Islands. It is not my intention to provide new empirical 
data, but rather to shift the scope of the debate on ramsi away from the 
limitations marked out by the failed state discourse. 
What’s in a Concept? The Failed States Literature 
and ramsi 
There are at least fi ve interrelated theoretical assumptions underpinning 
the framework advanced by the failed states literature.3 First, the state 
is understood as an “entity” comprising institutions and not as a set of 
social and political structures within which groups struggle for control and 
access to state resources. Second, state institutions are defi ned in terms of 
their policy capacities, derived from an ideal-type hypothetical model of a 
legal-rational modern state, and not in terms of or in relation to domestic 
social and political relationships. Institutions’ performance is then rated 
according to their capacity to carry out offi cial functions effectively, cre-
414 the contemporary pacifi c • 19:2 (2007)
ating a spectrum of state strength ranging from strong states with strong 
capacities at one end to failed states with weak or no capacities at the 
other. Third, this way of theorizing institutions sets up a dichotomous 
view of state and society. The relationship between the state apparatus 
and societal groups matters in this framework only to the extent that it 
hinders or promotes state capacity. Fourth, capacity is seen primarily as a 
matter of institutional design and therefore as susceptible to external infl u-
ence and direction. And fi nally, strong capacities are linked to the effort 
to carry out global functions, be they economic or political. In this sense, 
good governance, which is said to facilitate sustainable economic devel-
opment on the national level, is seen to underpin global governance. The 
international dimensions of state failure have become more pronounced 
following September 11 because the capacity of states to control their 
territories is now said to be linked directly to global security (Fukuyama 
2005). Indeed, as Kabutaulaka and Sinclair Dinnen have persuasively 
argued, Australia’s new interventionism in the Pacifi c is itself a result of 
the association of domestic governance with global threats (Kabutaulaka 
2005; Dinnen 2004).
The notion of capacity is pivotal in this framework. In the failed states 
literature, capacity is understood as the ability of the state, through its 
various institutions, to carry out the myriad functions that are expected of 
a modern state. It is “the ability of states to plan and execute policies and 
to enforce laws cleanly and transparently” (Fukuyama 2005, 9). Capacity, 
then, is defi ned in terms of the effectiveness of governance processes rather 
than as a socially constituted phenomenon. Based on this defi nition, Wain-
wright diagnosed Solomon Islands in mid-2003 as a failing state because 
it had “virtually ceased to function as an effective national entity” (2003, 
3; my italics). 
Since the failed states literature defi nes institutions by their policy 
capacity, it sets up a dichotomous conceptualization of state and society. 
Social and political relationships are not seen as intrinsic to institutions, 
but only as constraints or obstacles to performance. The implicit assump-
tion is that the institutions that make up the state are distinct from those 
of society because they have different, if sometimes complementary, roles. 
Some authors have gone so far as to view state and society as existing 
in a competitive relationship (eg, Wainwright 2003, 18). In cruder and 
more technocratic versions of the literature, the dichotomization of state 
and society has led to a near-exclusive focus on the structure and design 
of the formal institutions of the state apparatus (see dfat 2004). There 
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is, however, a signifi cant divergence between these so-called “state-cen-
tered” analyses, which characterize the offi cial ramsi position, and the 
more sophisticated literature on Solomon Islands—infl uenced by Joel S 
Migdal’s “state in society” framework (1988)—in which there is a genu-
ine effort to contextualize state power. This approach is mostly associated 
with Kabutaulaka and the Australian National University’s State, Society 
and Governance in Melanesia (ssgm) program. 
The ssgm group has produced a number of rigorous and useful studies 
on village-level and grassroots governance and the interrelations between 
formal state institutions and informal societal associations, which help 
shed light on Solomon Islands social and political structures (eg, Scales 
and others 2002; Morgan 2005; Bennett 2002). However, even in this 
more advanced variant of the literature on Solomon Islands, the state–
society binary is maintained; social and political relationships are not used 
to explain state behavior but are themselves explained in relation to the 
state’s capacity to implement policy and shape the rules and norms of 
society. This implicitly presumes that a distinction between state and soci-
ety can be drawn and that state capacity itself is an objective attribute. 
Therefore, while some of these authors have been critical of ramsi, they 
remain constrained by the same propensity to measure the effectiveness 
of governance in relation to an ideal-type hypothetical model. Because 
they have preconceived ideas about what constitutes state weakness and 
strength they often miss or misinterpret important dynamics.
The dichotomization of state and society in effect provides the rationale 
for external intervention. If the state, on the one hand, is understood as 
a set of governance institutions that are distinct from societal institutions 
and defi ned by their capacity to carry out certain tasks, and state capacity, 
on the other hand, is seen as an objective attribute, then it is a small step 
to conclude that external intervention can improve state capacity and thus 
prevent state failure by targeting the institutions that require assistance. 
While state capacity in the failed states literature is usually measured 
against tangible and quantifi able performance indicators such as gross 
domestic product, economic growth, the unemployment rate, and public 
health fi gures (dfat 2004), it is also often related to the more qualita-
tive notion of legitimacy. Thus, Robert I Rotberg claimed: “Nation-states 
fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer 
deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments 
lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation-state itself 
becomes illegitimate in the hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens” 
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(2003, 1). Legitimacy, then, is viewed functionally as a reward for good 
performance, with capacity the key to both state strength and legitimacy. 
This means that legitimacy, like capacity, is also understood in principle as 
premised on maintaining universal standards of governance, rather than 
in terms of how a particular government responds to internal social and 
political pressures. Michael Fullilove has argued that the notion of state 
failure is somewhat misleading in the Solomon Islands context because it 
suggests that an effective state once existed. But because institutions were 
never properly formed, the modern state was never truly legitimate (Ful-
lilove 2006; see also Wainwright 2003, 20).
This is an apolitical and functional version of legitimacy, which is 
unhelpful for explaining the emergence of political confl icts—a signifi cant 
theoretical problem, since the presence of intractable confl icts of various 
kinds is precisely the characteristic shared by the states depicted as failed, 
including Solomon Islands. If legitimacy denotes the absence of serious 
challenges to the authority of the state’s formal leadership, then it is diffi -
cult to accept that it is necessarily the outcome of improved state capacity. 
Arguably, it may be the case that confl ict is actually caused by improve-
ments in the capacity of the state apparatus to perform certain tasks not 
shored up by key interests.4 Furthermore, if Solomon Islands never had 
effective governance institutions and was therefore never legitimate, the 
question of timing arises: Why has the confl ict erupted only in the late 
1990s and not earlier? To answer this question we need to break free 
from the ideal-type “good governance” theoretical straightjacket that con-
strains the failed states literature and examine how confl ict in Solomon 
Islands was averted prior to 1998 and what has subsequently changed to 
exacerbate societal tensions. 
The functional theorization of legitimacy highlights the tendency of the 
failed states literature to confl ate description with explanation. State fail-
ure is said to be caused by dysfunctional institutions that fail to provide 
political goods, and a failed state by defi nition is one that does not deliver 
political goods. State failure, in this view, is by and large caused by poor 
governance, and therefore the only long-term solution, as protracted and 
arduous as it may be, is the promotion, usually by outsiders, of good 
governance and institutional capacity—what Francis Fukuyama defi ned 
as state building (2005, 28). This is a circular and problematic argument, 
albeit a self-reinforcing one. Because institutions are defi ned in terms of 
their respective policy capacities and their performance is assessed against 
external and preexisting standards, the literature is replete with descrip-
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tive, if extensive, institutional performance audits that are primarily aimed 
at measuring in what ways and to what degree a particular state deviates 
from a “proper,” functioning state.5 When confl icts emerge it is thus nec-
essarily seen as stemming from the incapacity of the state’s institutions to 
perform their “true” functions properly, resulting in the state’s delegitimi-
zation. This view does not allow for the prospect that institutions may not 
be dysfunctional so much as expressive of a different set of interests than 
that which is supportive of the sort of policies associated with the good-
governance model. In reality, “good” institutional design is just as likely 
to exacerbate confl ict as it is to prevent it. This possibility is acknowl-
edged to some extent in the literature, and indeed state building is often 
portrayed as an immensely diffi cult project with a patchy success record 
(Fullilove 2006, 1; Fukuyama 2005). Nevertheless, the failed states litera-
ture to date has failed to explain systematically why some interventions 
are more successful than others, or why confl icts emerge in some countries 
but not in others.6 
To summarize, state failure is not an objective and measurable condi-
tion. Rather, it entails a number of questionable understandings about 
confl ict that are based on a problematic and ahistorical theorization of 
the state and of institutions. In brief, confl ict is portrayed in the literature 
as the outcome of poor governance and low state capacity. In Solomon 
Islands, poor governance is explained as a consequence of the weakness of 
modern institutions vis-à-vis traditional ones. In the next section I exam-
ine this argument and provide an alternative analysis of governance in 
Solomon Islands before and after the start of the confl ict. 
Governance in Solomon Islands: Modernity, 
Custom, and Low State Capacity? 
An oft-heard and infl uential view is that the state in Solomon Islands has 
been weak since independence because the institutions and structures of 
modern statehood were imposed on a society— or indeed many societ-
ies—with markedly different traditional institutions that have proven 
resilient to change (dfat 2004, 3; Wainwright 2003, 27). At one end of 
the spectrum, this position has led to efforts to undermine traditional 
infl uences by engendering capacity-building programs such as ramsi to 
strengthen modern institutions. For example, Wainwright has argued that 
it is the relative weakness of modern institutions that has turned Solomon 
Islands into a failing state, and not the institutions’ profound unsuitability 
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to Melanesian societies. She claimed that if Solomon Islands had started 
off at independence with better-designed and stronger modern governance 
institutions, its development trajectory could have been very different and 
less erratic (Wainwright 2003, 20).
In contrast, the critics of the “state-centered” approach have assessed 
the strength of modern institutions in relation to the state’s ability to shape 
the rules and norms of society and in terms of the fi t between state and 
society (Larmour 1998). They have argued that the former approach is 
too coercive and that traditional forms of governance should in fact be 
engaged to make national-level governance work better and improve state 
capacity (Kabutaulaka 2005; Morgan and McLeod 2006). The strengths 
of this approach are that it brings into question the nexus between insti-
tutional design and state capacity and pays more attention to forms of 
governance that do not correspond with the legal-rational “good gover-
nance” model. 
Despite these important differences, both approaches share a relatively 
similar understanding of the connection between state–society relations 
and poor governance in Solomon Islands. In essence, poor governance is 
seen in terms of stunted modernization: the modern state is too weak to 
rein in premodern forces and therefore ends up captured by them. The 
approaches diverge mainly on the question of whether or not a successful 
state can or should incorporate some premodern Melanesian elements. 
However, the distinction between modernity and tradition is highly prob-
lematic. 
Eric Hobsbawm distinguished between “invented tradition” and “cus-
tom” (1983). In traditional societies, he argued, custom or customary law 
does not preclude change up to a point, because it has to contend with 
life’s challenges. It builds on the past but it is not infl exible. The object of 
tradition, on the other hand, is precisely invariance, and it need not have 
any direct, factual link with the historical past to which it refers: “It is the 
contrast between the constant change and innovation of the modern world 
and the attempt to structure at least some parts of social life within it as 
unchanging and invariant, that makes the ‘invention of tradition’ so inter-
esting for historians of the past two centuries” (Hobsbawm 1983, 2). 
In the context of the South Pacifi c, Roger Keesing built on Hobsbawm’s 
notion of the “invention of tradition” to argue that not only do contempo-
rary representations of Melanesian culture and custom by political elites 
bear tenuous resemblance to the documented pasts of those societies, but 
that these very representations are themselves often derived from, or in 
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relation to, Western ideologies and can only be understood in the context 
of European colonization and decolonization (1989). In this sense, ideal-
ized versions of indigenous cultures can serve to perpetuate patterns of 
control and domination in the postcolonial era that are not dissimilar to 
those of the colonial era. Keesing pointed out that, ironically, often those 
who espouse these static views of the past are also “(in their political 
actions and life-styles) hell-bent on technology, progress, materialism, and 
‘development’” (1989, 23).
Echoing Keesing, Jon Fraenkel has argued that the distinction between 
“imported” modern institutions and unchanging “indigenous” political 
structures in Solomon Islands is mechanistic and ahistorical:
It is over-simplistic to think of “introduced” modernity as ever subverted by 
unrelenting kastom. What was initially introduced has been deeply and irre-
versibly absorbed, and has become as much a part of perceived custom as 
that which has some formal continuity with age-old culture. Even customary 
compensation, which played such a critical role in the unfolding of the confl ict, 
was itself profoundly infl uenced by colonial pacifi cation, by the experience of 
Solomon Islanders on white-owned plantations, by the churches and by post-
colonial governments, not least during the crisis itself. (2004, 12)
As we can see, Solomon Islands institutions do not fi t neatly into a mod-
ern–customary dichotomy. Rather than being the static entities this binary 
implies, they have historically morphed and developed in response to 
changing economic, social, and political circumstances. While this fact 
does not deny the existence or signifi cance of Melanesian custom, it high-
lights its socially constituted nature. Custom is not a fi xed entity, some-
how external to social interaction, on which there is unequivocal consen-
sus. As with any social construct, it is contested and regularly invoked to 
legitimize a range of often-confl icting political ends.7 Viewing institutions 
through the modern–customary lens depoliticizes them because it removes 
their development from the context of political and ideological contesta-
tion. If we are to understand how institutions work, how and why they 
change, and, more importantly, what sort of confl icts are likely to emerge, 
we need to examine the social and political relationships that run through 
institutional structures, which interests are being promoted or marginal-
ized, and how these relationships have changed over time in relation to 
capitalist development (Rodan and Jayasuriya 2006). 
The modern–traditional dichotomy is also problematic for explaining 
how the state operates in Solomon Islands. Following Kevin Hewison, 
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Garry Rodan, and Richard Robison (1993, 4–5), I understand the state 
not simply as a set of institutions or a group of actors—modern or pre-
modern—but as an expression of political power. State power is a set of 
complex social relationships that is dynamic and shapes the use of the 
state apparatus. Because they exist within a context of social relations, it 
is misleading to view the state or its apparatus as neutral. Consequently, 
state and society are not mutually exclusive. In reality, the formal and 
informal institutions of both are spheres in which political power is orga-
nized, exercised, or indeed challenged. Because power relationships cut 
across the imaginary boundaries of state and society, examining these 
relationships is more important for explaining change and confl ict than 
focusing on the particular design of their physical institutional manifesta-
tions. Therefore, rather than attempting to explain diverging social and 
political outcomes with ahistorical and unchanging terms like modern and 
traditional, we must apply a political economy perspective to explain the 
changing contours of state power in Solomon Islands and the sort of con-
fl icts that are likely to emerge. 
Since the days of the British protectorate, economic development in 
Solomon Islands has mostly been premised on the extraction of natural 
resources by a small number of large-scale, foreign-owned operations. 
About 85 percent of the country’s diverse population survives on sub-
sistence agriculture and fi shing, at times supported by small cash crops 
sold in local markets. In 1912 the colonial administration banned freehold 
land sale to non–Solomon Islanders in favor of a lease system, and so 87 
percent of all land in Solomon Islands is still held by customary owners 
(Bennett 2002, 5; Kabutaulaka 2005, 299). Therefore, large operations 
usually involve foreign companies leasing land from indigenous commu-
nities, with the state bureaucracy acting as mediator and regulator. For 
example, the now defunct Solomon Islands Plantations Limited was 68 
percent owned by the British Commonwealth Development Corporation, 
and 30 percent owned by the Solomon Islands government, with 2 per-
cent allocated to customary landowners. The latter also received annu-
ally si$100 per hectare as land rental and si$500 per hectare as premium 
(Kabutaulaka 2001). Starting in the early 1980s, the government has 
allowed corporations to negotiate logging rights directly with customary 
landowners, with the state collecting tax duties for exports and licensing 
fees. In this industry, however, shared foreign–domestic business ventures 
did not emerge in the same way as in other industries (Frazer 1997). The 
economy’s narrow base and dependence on primary resources and for-
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eign capital have meant that its fortunes have fl uctuated wildly along with 
global commodity markets. 
As a result of this economic development model, the weakness of 
domestic bourgeoisie, and the occasional availability of foreign aid,8 the 
state apparatus has become the locus of economic and political power in 
Solomon Islands. At independence, power passed to an administrative and 
political elite largely committed to the continuation of this development 
pattern because it suited their interests and the interests of the bloated, 
unionized, and mostly urbanized public sector that provided their primary 
support base (Frazer 1997). This situation, however, does not explain the 
instability of politics in Solomon Islands, with about half of incumbent 
members of Parliament being replaced at almost every general election, 
nor the survival and legitimacy of the democratic process, including in 
the country’s supposedly marginalized rural constituencies.9 If indeed 
state power existed entirely at the behest of a relatively small Honiara-
based elite, then why, as Ian Frazer himself noted, did the infl uence of the 
bureaucracy actually weaken over time vis-à-vis the power of elected poli-
ticians? Intuitively, one would expect to see political power increasingly 
insulated from popular interference to protect the interests of bureaucratic 
and political elites. To explain this ostensibly contradictory situation, we 
must examine the role state-centered patronage networks played in sus-
taining this fragile social structure in the pre-crisis days. To understand 
how personalized patronage networks operate in Solomon Islands, let us 
look briefl y at how they shape the formal political process.
Solomon Islands has a Westminster-style system of government. Elec-
tion is based on the British “fi rst past the post” principle, and governments 
are formed by coalitions that require an absolute majority. In the West this 
model has usually been associated with a stable two-party system; how-
ever, in Solomon Islands, coalitions have been characterized by instability 
and changing allegiances. It is not unknown for members of Parliament 
and even ministers to cross the fl oor and support the Opposition’s no-con-
fi dence motions. Parties are mostly inactive between election campaigns 
and have fl imsy organizational structures and little grassroots support in 
the provinces (Morgan 2005; Roughan 2004, 17). Many parliamentarians 
are independent and not affi liated with any political party. Some commen-
tators, including former government minister Sam Alasia (1997, 2), have 
argued that political parties are weak in Solomon Islands because they 
are an imported institution that is incompatible with Melanesian culture, 
with its traditional focus on individual leadership. While there is no doubt 
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that the party concept is not indigenous, this factor is less signifi cant than 
the near absence of clear class cleavages, which usually form the basis of 
left-right divisions. Furthermore, Solomon Islands society, unlike that of 
neighboring Fiji, is too fragmented for ethnicity to become useful as a 
source of mainstream political mobilization (Reilly 2004). 
The arrival of independence before nationalism denied politicians in 
Solomon Islands the opportunity to use anticolonial sentiment as an instru-
ment to fashion national parties such as the ones that typifi ed sub-Saharan 
Africa’s decolonization. Protests have remained local and so has politi-
cal support. As a consequence, elections are usually dominated by local 
rather than national issues (Roughan 2004, 11). Even the anti-logging 
movement of the mid-1980s and early 1990s never became a nationwide 
phenomenon (Frazer 1997). Therefore, governments in Solomon Islands 
have been unable to maintain their cohesion through common purpose but 
have had to rely on patronage. Jeffrey Steeves has characterized this setup 
as a form of “unbounded politics,” premised on the weaving together of 
fragile power bases that rely on personal allegiances (quoted in Fraenkel 
2004, 38). Before ramsi’s arrival, the Solomon Islands business class was 
small and weak, and therefore the cash that maintained this system came 
from the state, foreign corporations, and later from Taiwan and China, 
and not so much from the domestic private sector. The result is a highly 
competitive political system in which reelection is far from guaranteed and 
governments seldom complete their four-year term.10 
Thus, the patronage system and associated corruption in Solomon 
Islands do not constitute an aberration or deviation. They are not rooted 
in the preponderance of tradition and culture over legal-rational forms of 
governance. State-oriented patronage networks form the very foundation 
of the political system in Solomon Islands, because no other arrangement 
is able to sustain and integrate the state’s many disparate societal forces. 
This is not a matter of traditional versus modern institutions, but one of 
political coalition making in the context of limited and unsustained eco-
nomic development, which is reliant on foreign-owned, resource-intensive, 
and migrant labor–dependent export industries, in a geographically and 
ethnically fragmented country. The relative success of organized planta-
tion workers in securing improved working conditions early in the twen-
tieth century (Bennett 2002, 4), and the ability of the trade union move-
ment to safeguard members’ rights in the 1980s and early 1990s (Prasad 
and Snell 2004) demonstrate that Solomon Islanders from different ethnic 
backgrounds are not “culturally” incapable of organizing and articulating 
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collective demands. The lack of cohesion in Solomon Islands politics is not 
merely a case of inadequately constructed colonial institutions; it is shaped 
to a signifi cant extent by political and economic realities and the interests 
of the primary societal groups.
One of the defi ning characteristics of this governance structure has been 
the relatively small scale of personal wealth accumulation in the upper 
echelons of government and bureaucracy. While their counterparts in 
sub-Saharan Africa have amassed legendary fortunes, Solomon Islander 
elites have usually used their access to state resources to distribute wealth 
through patronage networks. Indeed, political survival has largely been 
based on politicians’ ability to provide benefi ts to their constituencies. 
While some have associated this with the Melanesian tradition of “Big-
man” leadership (Turnbull 2002, 194), this pattern has more to do with a 
lack of real alternatives for sustaining political power. 
Patronage was not strictly an informal practice in Solomon Islands. 
Until the 1997–1998 abolition of the area councils, it was institutional-
ized in three tiers of government. While the provincial governments and 
area councils had some independent political and administrative space, 
they were almost entirely reliant on the national government for funding 
(Frazer 1997; Scales and others 2002, 9). Patronage was also institutional-
ized through the Constituency Development Fund—an unaudited discre-
tionary fund allocated to members of Parliament.11 
As we can see, state power in pre-confl ict Solomon Islands fundamen-
tally relied on the public sector, some landowner groups,12 and a highly 
complex network of patronage penetrating as far as the village level, 
which mitigated the negative effects of highly uneven economic devel-
opment. Because resources were sparse and the interests of stakeholders 
often contradictory, keeping this coalition together was indeed a diffi cult 
task. Ironically, while the constantly shifting and dynamic nature of state 
power had made policy making a very erratic business in pre-1998 Solo-
mon Islands, the inability of any single ethnic group or class to dominate 
the state had ensured its integrity. Although Frazer was correct to argue 
that the main benefi ciaries of this system were Honiara-based political 
and bureaucratic elites (1997), it was also the case that this arrangement 
survived because of its open-ended and volatile structure and because the 
interests that dominated it were sensitive to dissent and worked to co-opt 
potential threats. 
Thus far I have shown that the modern–traditional binary is problem-
atic for explaining political outcomes in Solomon Islands. Also problem-
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atic, therefore, is the perception that low state capacity in Solomon Islands 
is a result of the weakness of modern institutions. As we have seen, state 
capacity is understood in the failed states literature as an external attri-
bute measured against legal-rational good governance standards rather 
than social and political relationships. When the social and political con-
text is considered, it is mostly in relation to the propensity of societal 
forces to enhance or undermine state capacity. Consequently, ramsi has 
sought to identify and support sympathetic elements in Solomon Islands 
bureaucracy and civil society, such as Central Bank Governor Rick Hou 
and National Peace Council Chair Paul Tovua. In contrast, it has effec-
tively marginalized groups deemed antagonistic to or unhelpful for gov-
ernance reforms. For instance, although Nick Warner claimed that ramsi 
saw consultations with the public sector unions as essential to economic 
recovery and reform, he weighed in to prevent negotiated public service 
pay increases from taking place in late 2003, much to the unions’ chagrin 
(ramsi 2004). 
State capacity in Solomon Islands must be understood in relation to 
the political and social relationships that underpin state power and gov-
ernance rather than in relation to an external “best practice” standard, 
because the latter tells us little about the dynamics of confl ict inherent in 
the Solomon Islands political structure. While state capacity in the Webe-
rian legal-rational sense has never been high in Solomon Islands, this does 
not explain the timing of the confl ict or its development trajectory. Since 
capacity is in itself a socially constituted expression of political power, we 
must assess it in relation to the ability of groups and classes to promote 
their interests while avoiding confl ict. Therefore, unlike Wainwright (2003) 
and Fullilove (2006), I argue that the 1998–2003 crisis does not represent 
the inherent shortcomings of the Solomon Islands patronage-based system 
of governance; it erupted because this system was disregarded and chal-
lenged. The crisis was not an outcome of arrested modernity or low state 
capacity, but of pressures on the capacity of the patronage system to quell 
tensions. This point is signifi cant because ramsi is attempting to relaunch 
some of the programs that were partly responsible for the emergence and 
escalation of the confl ict. That said, there is no doubt that the pre-crisis 
patronage system did not provide a panacea to the many problems faced 
by Solomon Islands, and it defi nitely perpetuated and possibly accentu-
ated uneven development between Honiara and the provinces as well as 
within the capital. However, in the social, economic, and political context 
of Solomon Islands, the patronage system offered a modicum of stabil-
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ity because of its deep provincial outreach and redistributive functions. I 
now examine this contention against the two main phases of the crisis: the 
outbreak in 1998 of the ethnic confl ict on Guadalcanal, and the postcoup 
period of lawlessness and criminality. 
The 1998–2003 Confl ict: Reforms, Guns, and 
Uneven Development
There is a near consensus in the literature that the 1998 Isatabu uprising 
had identifi able roots in the political economy (Kabutaulaka 2001; dfat 
2004). An Oxfam Community Aid Abroad report argues that although 
the confl ict was initially understood as an ethnic one, debates over iden-
tity and ethnicity in Solomon Islands take place in a broader context of 
economic change affected by globalization, corruption, and the failure of 
a development model based on the exploitation of natural resources by 
large foreign-owned corporations (2003, 3). Kabutaulaka claimed that the 
problem of uneven development was more pronounced in Guadalcanal 
for a number of reasons: most of the large operations are located there; the 
Guadalcanal plains are the most fertile region in the country; there were 
more Malaitan migrants in Guadalcanal than in any other province; and 
the capital Honiara is itself located on alienated Guale land (2001). 
There were some displays of sectarian resentment prior to 1998, most 
notably in 1988 when a large number of Guale (Guadalcanal Islanders) 
demonstrated in Honiara after multiple murders at nearby Mt Austin, 
reportedly perpetrated by Malaitan settlers. The Guale demanded, among 
other things, the establishment of a federal system of government, a more 
equitable distribution of the benefi ts from resource exploitation in Gua-
dalcanal, and an immediate halt to internal migration (Fraenkel 2004, 
189–196). The same demands were reiterated in a document presented to 
Prime Minister Ulufa‘alu by the Guadalcanal Provincial Assembly on 4 
February 1999 entitled “Demands by the Bona Fide and Indigenous Peo-
ple of Guadalcanal” (see Fraenkel 2004, 197–203). The document also 
demanded that Honiara be relocated to another island and that the gov-
ernment pay compensation to Guadalcanal Province for the 1988 murders 
and for other crimes.
While the role of uneven development, unsustainable resource exploi-
tation, and large-scale internal migration in the confl ict is indisputable, 
aspects that have been overlooked by many commentators is leadership 
and agency. The fact of uneven development within and between states, 
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regions, classes, or ethnic groups cannot in itself account for sectarian vio-
lence. There are innumerable examples of countries and societies in which 
such divisions exist without evolving into a large-scale, violent confl ict. 
Indeed, the very nature of capitalist development creates increasing wealth 
disparities. In the case of the Isatabu uprising, as in other confl icts, politi-
cal leaders successfully appealed to real or imagined grievances in order to 
mobilize popular support. Such leadership agency was perhaps even more 
signifi cant here, since the notion of a single Guale ethnic identity was very 
weak prior to the uprising and no overarching Guadalcanal-wide organi-
zations existed aside from the provincial assembly. 
Arguably, Guale resentment fl ared up in 1998, and not earlier, for two 
main reasons: the fi rst and most signifi cant was the Public Sector Reform 
Program (psrp) of the Solomon Islands Alliance for Change (siac) gov-
ernment (Kabutaulaka 1999), and the second was the growing presence, 
since 1989, of thousands of Bougainvilleans in Guadalcanal (Kabutau-
laka 2001). The latter is mostly useful for explaining the aggressive form 
assumed by the Guale resistance movement, rather than its emergence. 
The Public Sector Reform Program met tough resistance from its incep-
tion in late 1997. As former Solomon Islands Central Bank Governor and 
longtime expatriate resident Tony Hughes pointed out, “the government 
persuaded itself that there was more offi cial support for reform than actu-
ally existed, and underestimated the covert resistance to substantive change 
that was quickly established by vested interests throughout the public sec-
tor” (quoted in Fraenkel 2004, 41). Kabutaulaka noted that while the 
plan enjoyed strong support from international fi nancial institutions and 
the aid community, its details were never widely discussed with key stake-
holders and the majority of Solomon Islanders (1999). siac Prime Minis-
ter Ulufa‘alu argued, in a document entitled “Beneath Guadalcanal,” that 
the confl ict was orchestrated for selfi sh reasons by vested interests that 
stood to lose from his necessary reforms (2000). This sentiment was not 
entirely unjustifi ed. For example, former Police Commissioner Frank Short 
alleged that Guadalcanal provincial leaders, including Premier Ezekiel Ale-
bua, planned the rural eviction campaign of Malaitans together with key 
ifm militants at a meeting held at the Tambea Resort as early as March 
1998 (Fraenkel 2004, 64). It is diffi cult, however, to accept Ulufa‘alu’s 
claim that the entire uprising was orchestrated from above. After decades 
of interisland migration, illegal settlement, and grossly uneven develop-
ment, the “Bona Fide” document was “not simply opportunistic demands 
[made] by a money-hungry elite,” but genuinely felt grievances (Fraenkel 
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2004, 50). Thus, although provincial leaders and opportunistic politicians 
played an essential part in igniting the fl ames, they quickly lost control 
of the wildfi re. It seems that leaders like Alebua who incited the Guale 
to action at the early stages did not expect the turmoil to develop as far 
as it did (Fraenkel 2004, 65). Nevertheless, the involvement of provincial 
political leaders in the early stages of the uprising was instrumental—in 
the context of poor communication and little interaction between villages 
in Guadalcanal’s various regions—in galvanizing disparate pockets of dis-
content and resistance into one movement. As we have already seen, the 
same did not happen with the anti-logging movement of the 1980s and 
early 1990s. 
In October 1997, the Public Sector Reform Program was presented as 
an emergency plan to resuscitate the country’s fl agging economy (Ulufa‘alu 
2000). Logging exports were hit hard by the Asian crisis, and while the 
country’s rapidly depleting forests were given some respite, the economy 
plunged into deep recession. Real gross domestic product, for instance, 
fell by almost 2 percent. As a result, government debt ballooned, with 
arrears alone equaling approximately 11 percent of gross domestic prod-
uct (Knapman and Saldanha 1999, 124). Ulufa‘alu insisted that the plan 
was homegrown, but Kabutaulaka argued that it “was obvious . . . that 
many of the reform proposals were not entirely new. They refl ected neolib-
eral and economic rationalist initiatives elsewhere, especially those propa-
gated by international fi nancial institutions and aid agencies” (1999, 443). 
And indeed, in order to attract donor funding, the government agreed to 
cut government expenditure, lay off 550 public servants, privatize state-
owned enterprises, sell off government property, cancel all duty remissions 
and tax exemptions, and encourage private-sector investment. The plan 
aimed to bolster government fi nances by improving tax collection and 
cutting expenditure mainly by reducing government payroll. One of its 
fi rst priorities was servicing loans. Hence, most of the August 1998 us$25 
million loan from the Asian Development Bank (adb) was used to clear 
outstanding arrears (Knapman and Saldanha 1999).
While adb economists Bruce Knapman and Cedric D Saldanha praised 
the high level of domestic ownership of the reforms (1999, 132), key 
stakeholders were conspicuously left out and the plan had a very nar-
row support base. To cut government expenditure, Ulufa‘alu abolished 
the area councils in 1997 and replaced them with unelected ward offi cers 
(Scales and others 2002, 9). As Ian Scales pointed out, this weakened the 
government’s presence in the villages (2003, 3), but more signifi cantly, it 
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cut off local leaders from patronage networks. Similarly, budget alloca-
tions to provincial governments were reduced. Although the government 
attempted to shore up the support of the public sector unions, planned 
large-scale redundancies sparked protests and debilitating strikes in 
June 1998 (Knapman and Saldanha 1999, 135). Furthermore, the log-
ging industry and its many political allies, who were naturally opposed to 
increased government scrutiny of transactions and to the abolition of tax 
benefi ts, weighed in to undermine the program (Moore 2004, 103). The 
sale of the government’s share of Solomon Islands Plantations Limited also 
proved contentious. Ulufa‘alu announced that 20 percent would be sold 
to the Commonwealth Development Corporation, and 10 percent would 
be left with the Investment Corporation of Solomon Islands and eventu-
ally sold to interested locals (Kabutaulaka 1999). Landowners and the 
Guadalcanal Provincial Government expressed their dissatisfaction with 
this proposal and demanded that more shares be handed over directly to 
them (Moore 2004, 105). The Gold Ridge mine, which began operating 
in 1998, did make a signifi cant contribution to government revenue, but 
it was shrouded in controversy, and disputes between the Australian own-
ers and landowners’ groups were common (Moore 2004, 85–88). Conse-
quently, government plans to attract more mining operations and other 
large-scale, land-intensive operations to the country were unpopular in the 
provinces (McDonald 2003). 
In sum, Ulufa‘alu attempted the unfeasible task of simultaneously cut ting 
off village-level leadership and other key interests, while seeking to attract 
support for far-reaching and radical reforms. The Public Sector Reform 
Program relied on a narrow and precarious coalition of some domestic 
business interests and several medium- and high-ranking bureaucrats along 
with strong external support from donors. It was in this context that pro-
vincial politicians began trying to undermine the government. Contrary 
to common perceptions of the inverted relationship between capacity and 
confl ict, the reform program actually strengthened state capacity in the 
legal-rational sense. Ironically, improved capacity exacerbated rather than 
prevented confl ict. 
The second major challenge to stability in Solomon Islands came from 
ex-militants, gang leaders, and their politician collaborators, who sought 
to establish a heavily skewed and exploitative political order by force. Fol-
lowing the June 2000 coup, the country entered a period of lawlessness and 
thuggery that lasted until ramsi’s intervention. The signing of the Towns-
ville Peace Agreement in October 2000 proved an important turning point: 
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While opportunism and criminal behavior were common on both sides 
since the beginning of the confl ict, the cessation of hostilities and the for-
mal dissolution of the militias made it increasingly untenable for ex-mili-
tants to claim they were pursuing anything other than self-interest.13 
On assuming offi ce after the coup, Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare 
declared that his government believed in “justice before peace.” Thus he 
promised to use public money to compensate Solomon Islanders for what 
they had lost during the confl ict (Fraenkel 2004, 95). In Melanesian custom, 
compensation in the form of pigs, shell money, and other gifts is an impor-
tant peace-building measure. Offenders are traditionally not punished indi-
vidually for crimes they have committed; rather, their entire community is 
held responsible and must compensate the victim’s community. However, 
as Clive Moore noted, “After the coup . . . these long-standing customs 
took an interesting turn and became a commercialised growth industry” 
(2004, 160). Some ex-militants and politicians began making exorbitant 
compensation claims, mostly against the state but also against businesses 
and communities. For example, an Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
(abc) Four Corners report showed a group of Malaitan thugs descend on 
an ethnically Malaitan fi shing village in Guadalcanal and receive si$5,000 
(us$800) in compensation for a shooting incident that had only occurred 
because they attacked the village in the fi rst place (abc 2002).14 The deal 
was negotiated by Alex Bartlett, who at that time was a government min-
ister and a former mef leader. Moreover, Allan Kemakeza had to resign in 
2001 from his deputy prime minister position because he had misappro-
priated funds from a Taiwanese loan. Snyder Rini, whose election as prime 
minister sparked the April 2006 riots, was also implicated in the misallo-
cation of compensation funds (Moore 2004, 162). Between October 2000 
and May 2001, the government paid si$18.82 million (us$3.73 million) 
to 270 claimants, many of whom were ex-militants or politicians. Several 
ministers in the Sogavare and Kema keza governments, like Bartlett, Dan-
iel Fa‘afunua, and Benjamin Una, were former mef leaders, and others 
maintained close links with ex-militants. 
The open confl ict from 1998 to 2000 caused an economic meltdown in 
Solomon Islands, and the government became almost entirely reliant on 
logging and aid (imf 2004, 40). Thus, the compensation feeding frenzy 
took place at a time Solomon Islands could least afford it. The budgetary 
situation was worsened by an increase in the public service salary compo-
nent, up from si$166 million (us$34.74 million) in 1999 to about si$180 
million (us$35.64 million) in 2000 and 2001 (imf 2004, 41), because 
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of the mass recruitment of “special constables”—ex-militants—to the 
police.
Not only did the postcoup state provide very few political goods to the 
majority of Solomon Islanders, but it also brought them much misery and 
despair. Yet it is inaccurate to claim that it was dysfunctional. The post-
coup state was an organized attempt to establish a political order to serve 
the interests of a small, armed minority (Fraenkel 2004, 145). Neverthe-
less, because of its very narrow support bases, it was always going to be a 
highly unstable arrangement, even by Solomon Islands standards. While 
ex-militants were remarkably adept, through cooptation and intimidation, 
at creating networks that spanned some parts of the public service and 
the political system, they exerted little effort to create wider consensus or 
include more interests in the new system of patronage. This explain why, 
unlike most international commentators, many Solomon Islander observ-
ers preferred to see the crisis as one of leadership rather than the economy 
or law and order (Kabutaulaka 2005; Sanga 2003, 5; Roughan 2003). 
Indeed, some past national leaders—like Solomon Mamaloni who, as John 
Moffat Fugui noted (2001), was hugely popular in Solomon Islands—were 
also involved in corrupt activities (Moore 2004). They had, however, paid 
more attention to the requirements of coalition building. 
As we have seen, the political cohesion of Solomon Islands has relied 
largely on the inability of any single group to seize state power. Similarly, 
the country’s democratic system of government has been sustained by this 
power vacuum—there is just no other workable power-sharing solution. 
The mef militants who deposed Ulufa‘alu were aware of this fact, and it 
is telling that they did not seek to take over the state directly or change 
the constitution. Despite some irregularities, the facade of normalcy and 
procedure was maintained (Fraenkel 2004, 93). The ransacking of state 
coffers was done indirectly, under the guise of customary compensation 
claims, using formal government procedures. Jon Fraenkel called it “the 
instrumentalisation of disorder” (2004, 139).15 
Nevertheless, the highly exploitative and exclusive nature of the post-
coup patronage networks made them unsustainable, particularly consider-
ing the harsh economic realities. These networks relied on brute strength 
and not real support bases. Consequently, public resentment and discon-
tent were only a matter of time. While some were riding the compensa-
tion “gravy train,” most public servants went unpaid for months, funding 
to services in the provinces almost ceased, and communities, particularly 
on Guadalcanal and Malaita, suffered from the deterioration in law and 
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order as well as the fi nancial burden of bogus compensation claims (Moore 
2004). The emergence of the Civil Society Network in early 2001 demon-
strated the depth and pervasiveness of disaffection. It brought together the 
hitherto unlikely coalition of the churches, the trade unions, nongovern-
mental organizations (ngos), the Chamber of Commerce, and women’s 
groups (Prasad and Snell 2004, 276). 
Starting in late 2002, resentment began to surface. In September, the 
police chased the previously untouchable Jimmy “Rasta” out of Honiara 
to Malaita. Later that year about four hundred “special constables” were 
successfully decommissioned by a United Nations program, and cracks 
began appearing in the cozy relationship between politicians and ex-mili-
tants (Fraenkel 2004, 152–153). When the last portion of a Taiwanese 
Export-Import Bank (exim) loan was exhausted in December 2002 and 
the state’s reserves fi nally emptied, politicians started distancing themselves 
from arrangements that were no longer useful. For example, Kemakeza, 
who had defi ned himself as a “friend of the militants” in December 2001 
(Fraenkel 2004, 139), started shopping around for foreign assistance, 
because he knew that the police would not be able to challenge the mili-
tants directly. At the same time, many ex-militants, who realized the tide 
was turning, started talking publicly about their mutually benefi cial ties 
with corrupt politicians and senior public servants (Fraenkel 2004, 153). 
Therefore, ramsi was seen by the government and most Solomon Island-
ers fi rst and foremost as a “circuit breaker” to quickly disarm the former 
militants. The insistence on a comprehensive intervention with a signifi -
cant governance reforms component was added later as a condition by 
Australian offi cials, not least because of the categorization of Solomon 
Islands as a failing state in Australian foreign policymaking circles. 
To summarize, the two stages of the crisis carry an important lesson 
about governance and confl ict in Solomon Islands. Crucially, they must 
be understood as irregularities; otherwise, it is diffi cult to explain why 
the confl ict did not take place earlier. This understanding is vastly differ-
ent from ramsi’s approach, which is based on the view that the political 
system in Solomon Islands in its entirety constitutes an aberration from 
“proper” forms of governance. The most important implication of this 
alternate perspective for ramsi is that while there is real support in Solo-
mon Islands for an external “circuit breaker” to get rid of the ex-militants 
and their associates, there is no similar backing for a comprehensive over-
haul of governance. In fact, ramsi’s agenda exacerbates the potential for 
confl ict, for two reasons: First, the poverty-reduction strategies promoted 
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by ramsi and other donors are based on the supposed “trickle-down” 
effect of improved economic growth through export-oriented, market-
driven reform. The measures pursued to attract investors actually increase 
poverty, at least in the medium term, because like the 1997 Public Sector 
Reform Program, they stipulate severe cuts in government spending and 
public sector redundancies, and apply pressure on the customary land-
ownership system (Barr 2004). Second, completely dismantling patronage 
networks is dangerous because there are currently no societal forces in 
Solomon Islands able to provide national leadership. Arguably, the small 
bureaucratic, business, and ngo elites that benefi t from ramsi’s involve-
ment will only be able to sustain their position after the mission’s depar-
ture if they engage in the painstaking and unstable coalition building that 
was supposed to end. 
Conclusion: Beyond the April 2006 Riots
At the time of this writing, violent protests in Honiara have shocked the 
unstable truce that has existed in Solomon Islands since ramsi’s arrival. 
Following the election of Kemakeza’s former deputy Snyder Rini as prime 
minister, thousands of Solomon Islanders took to the streets, causing total 
devastation to the once thriving Chinese precinct. While the riots came as 
a shock to many Australians and international observers, there had been 
earlier warning signs that ramsi had failed to reshape politics in Solomon 
Islands as it had set out to do. For example, Labour Party leader Joses 
Tuhanuku, who ended up losing his Rennell-Bellona parliamentary seat, 
said before the elections that “dirty money” and “backroom chats” would 
feature heavily when members of Parliament voted for prime minister. He 
also accused Kemakeza and other leaders of colluding with Taiwan to 
fund selected candidates and bribe members to ensure Kemakeza’s reelec-
tion (The Age 2006). Indeed, many of the protesters accused Rini, a close 
associate of Kemakeza, of using Chinese and Taiwanese money to bribe 
his way into offi ce (Walters 2006).
Almost overnight the near euphoria surrounding ramsi in Australian 
policy-making circles dissipated and was replaced with a sense of uncer-
tainty. The Australian government reacted by dispatching a large military 
contingent to bring calm back to the burning streets of Honiara. However, 
military deployment is no real solution to the deep-seated problems that 
underlie the riots.
What the riots signify is the growing disaffection of many Solomon 
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Islanders with their marginalization from important political and economic 
processes. The protests also demonstrated resentment of the increasing 
clout in Honiara of a small and mostly Chinese business class who have 
benefi ted from ramsi contracts and the presence of aid workers and other 
foreign personnel in the country, as well as from lucrative ties with East 
and Southeast Asian corporations (Moore 2006). However, like the ex-
militants during the confl ict, while this Honiara-based bourgeoisie is capa-
ble of infl uencing politicians, it is much less interested in creating wide 
support bases with real provincial outreach. As wealth disparities grow 
under ramsi’s pro-market governance reforms, the already frail connec-
tion between Honiara and the provinces is weakening even further. 
ramsi’s work has been shaped by the notion that the confl ict in Solo-
mon Islands was the consequence of poor governance and low state capac-
ity stemming from the weakness of the modern state. Indeed, this is the 
dominant theme of the failed states literature. However, as we have seen, 
confl ict in Solomon Islands, as elsewhere, should not be understood in 
relation to the absence of universally valid governance institutions, but 
rather in relation to the actual political, social, and economic conditions 
in the country. Because patronage networks have acted to ameliorate ten-
sions emanating from a pattern of highly uneven economic development, 
to undermine them, as ramsi does, is potentially dangerous. A peace-
ful future for Solomon Islands can be realized if the country’s political, 
bureaucratic, and business leaders manage to assemble stable coalitions 
of interest. ramsi impedes the development of such coalitions by impos-
ing conditions that are detrimental to their formulation and by promoting 
certain interests that neither enjoy wide bases of support nor demonstrate 
any inclination to cultivate them.
* * *
I would like to thank Garry Rodan, Kanishka Jayasuriya, Toby Carroll, and 
two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments on earlier versions of this 
article. The responsibility for the fi nal contents, of course, is solely mine.
Notes
1 Starting on 18 April 2006 after the election of Snyder Rini as prime minister, 
thousands of Solomon Islanders rioted over two nights in central Honiara. In the 
aftermath, the city’s Chinatown—its commercial hub—lay in ruins. Ethnic Chi-
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nese were the main target of rioters, partly because of allegations that Taiwanese 
and Chinese money had facilitated Rini’s victory (Walters and Hart 2006). In 
response Australian troops from Townsville were sent to stop the violence and 
restore calm to Honiara. 
2 The annual population growth rate is approximately 3 percent; it is now 
estimated it would take Solomon Islands almost thirty years of average 4.5 per-
cent annual growth just to reach pre-confl ict per capita gross domestic product 
(Fullilove 2006, 10).
3 In this work I focus on the concept of the failed state and its limitations for 
explaining the crisis in Solomon Islands. Therefore, the scope of this article does 
not allow for an analysis that aims to situate ramsi, as well as its different and 
sometimes confl icting components, in the context of Australian domestic politics, 
the historical relationship between Australia and the Pacifi c Island states, and the 
changing framings of the Pacifi c within Australian policy-making circles. Some of 
these important issues have been examined in Fry 1997, McDougall 2002, and 
Kabutaulaka 2005.
4 As I illustrate later, this is precisely what happened in Solomon Islands in 
1997–1998 when the Ulufa‘alu siac government attempted, in response to pres-
sures from the International Monetary Fund (imf) and the Asian Development 
Bank (adb), to implement a wide-ranging public sector reform program (psrp).
5 In this sense, see Fukuyama’s “Denmark” metaphor (2005, 30), which refers 
not to the real Scandinavian kingdom but to Denmark as a generic “developed 
country with well-functioning state institutions.”
6 As Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz demonstrated (2004), even the litera-
ture’s fundamental contention that legal-rational governance structures are nec-
essarily better suited than other arrangements to promote sustained economic 
development is contestable. In some cases, as in Indonesia, economic develop-
ment has been facilitated by coalitions of interests representing premodern or 
oligarchic politics, rather than by Weberian legal-rational governance.
7 Nowhere is this more evident than in the contentious issue of post-confl ict 
compensation.
8 The main donors, including Australia, only started attaching conditions 
to their aid in the mid-1990s in response to reckless logging practices (Hughes 
2003).
9 Elise Huffer has demonstrated that voting rates in the Pacifi c have usually 
been higher than in most Western countries that do not practice compulsory vot-
ing (2005).
10 Yash Ghai pointed out a similar pattern in Papua New Guinea (1997). 
11 This fund has not been available since June 2000 due to lack of funding 
(Scales and others 2002, 9). 
12 Although leasing customary land to multinational corporations was a very 
divisive issue in many communities, corporations were adept at persuading and 
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bribing local leaders (Frazer 1997). For an illuminating analysis of the implica-
tions of logging on local communities in Solomon Islands, see Hviding and Bay-
liss-Smith 2000.
13 It did not stop notorious ex-militants like Jimmy “Rasta” from claiming 
they had to hold on to their weapons because Harold Keke refused to sign the 
Townsville Peace Agreement (Fraenkel 2004, 141).
14 Later, gang leader Jimmy “Rasta” extorted a further si$60,000 (us$9,600) 
from the government in compensation for the same offense. The money was 
deducted from the village’s schooling allowance (Fraenkel 2004, 145). 
15 The fact that most compensation claims were directed at the state, even 
though the crimes had been committed by the Isatabu Freedom Movement and 
the Malaita Eagle Force, is in itself an example of the central role of the state in 
organizing and sustaining patronage networks in Solomon Islands. The term “the 
instrumentalization of disorder” was fi rst used by Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal 
Daloz (1999). 
References
abc, Australian Broadcasting Corporation
 2002   Guns and Money. Four Corners, television broadcast transcript, 20 
May http://www.abc.net.au /4corners /stories /s559713.htm [accessed 1 
October 2005]
The Age
 2006   Critic of Solomons pm Loses Seat. 6 April. http://www.theage.com
.au /news / World /Critic-of-Solomons-PM-loses-seat /2006/04 /06/
1143916623730.html [accessed 7 April 2006]
Alasia, Sam
 1997   Party Politics and Government in Solomon Islands. State, Society and 
Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion paper 1997 / 7. Canberra: 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National 
University.
AusAID, Australian Agency for International Development
 2000   Good Governance: Guiding Principles for Implementation. Canberra: 
Australian Government. 
Barr, Kevin J
 2004   Fiji and the Pacific: Competing Paradigms of Good Governance, 
Human Rights and Democracy. In The Reality of Aid 2004: Focus on 
Governance and Human Rights. Online publication. Quezon City, The 
Philippines: Reality of Aid Secretariat. http: // www.realityofaid.org /
roareport.php?table = roa2004&id =61 [accessed 15 July 2005]
Bennett, Judith
 2002   Roots of Conflict in Solomon Islands: Though Much Is Taken Much 
436 the contemporary pacifi c • 19:2 (2007)
Abides; Legacies of Tradition and Colonialism. State, Society and Gov-
ernance in Melanesia Discussion Paper 2002 /5. Canberra: Research 
School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National Univer-
sity.
Berger, Mark T, and Heloise Weber
 2006   Beyond State-Building: Global Governance and the Crisis of the Nation-
State System in the 21st Century. Third World Quarterly 27 (1): 201–
208.
Bilgin, Pinar, and Adam David Morton 
 2002   Historicising Representations of “Failed States”: Beyond the Cold-War 
Annexation of the Social Sciences. Third World Quarterly 23 (1): 55–
80.
Chabal, Patrick, and Jean-Pascal Daloz
 1999   Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press.
dfat, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government
 2004   Solomon Islands: Rebuilding an Island Economy. Canberra: Economic 
Analytical Unit.
Dinnen, Sinclair
 2004   Australia’s New Interventionism in the Southwest Pacific. Paper pre-
sented at the “Foreign Policy, Governance and Development: Chal-
lenges for Papua New Guinea and Pacific Islands” conference, Madang, 
Papua New Guinea, 22–23 March.
Field, Michael
 2003   Australia Leads Charge in Operation Helpum Fren: Is It Massive Overkill 
or Recolonisation. Pacific Magazine, Online Edition, 1 September. http://
www.pacificislands.cc/pm92003/pmdefault.php?urlarticleid=0049 
[accessed 24 August 2005]
Fraenkel, Jon
 2004   The Manipulation of Custom: From Uprising to Intervention in the 
Solomon Islands. Wellington, nz: Victoria University Press.
Frazer, Ian
 1997   The Struggle for Control of Solomon Island Forests. The Contempo-
rary Pacific 9:39–72.
Fry, Greg
 1997   Framing the Islands: Knowledge and Power in Changing Australian 
Images of the Pacific. The Contemporary Pacific 9:305–344.
Fugui, John Moffat
 2001   Solomon Islands. Political Reviews: Melanesia. The Contemporary 
Pacific 13:551–556.
Fukuyama, Francis
 2005   State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. Lon-
don: Profile Books.
hameiri • the trouble with ramsi 437
Fullilove, Michael
 2006   The Testament of Solomons: RAMSI and International State-Building. 
Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
Ghai, Yash
 1997   Establishing a Liberal Political Order through a Constitution: The 
Papua New Guinea Experience. Development and Change 28 (2): 
303–330.
Hewison, Kevin, Garry Rodan, and Richard Robison
 1993   Introduction: Changing Forms of State Power in Southeast Asia. In 
Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capi-
talism, edited by Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison, and Garry Rodan, 
2–8. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
Hobsbawm, Eric
 1983   Introduction: Inventing Traditions. In The Invention of Tradition, edited 
by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, 1–14. Cambridge, ny: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
Howard, John
 2003   Ministerial Statement to Parliament on the Regional Assistance Mis-
sion to the Solomon Islands (ramsi). Australian Government Depart-
ment of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 12 August. http: // www.pm.gov
.au /news /speeches /speech422.html [accessed 24 August 2005]
Huffer, Elise
 2005   Governance, Corruption, and Ethics in the Pacific. The Contemporary 
Pacific 17:118–140.
Hughes, Helen
 2003   Aid Has Failed the Pacific. Issue Analysis 33. Sydney: The Centre for 
Independent Studies, March.
Hviding, Edvard, and Tim Bayliss-Smith
 2000   Islands of Rainforest: Agroforestry, Logging and Eco-tourism in Solo-
mon Islands. Aldershot, uk: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
imf, International Monetary Fund
 2004   Solomon Islands: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix. In IMF Coun-
try Report 04 /255. Washington dc: imf.
Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius Tara
 1999   Solomon Islands. Political Reviews: Melanesia. The Contemporary 
Pacific 11:443–449.
 2001   Beyond Ethnicity: The Political Economy of the Guadalcanal Crisis 
in Solomon Islands. State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Proj-
ect Working Paper 1 /2001. Canberra: Research School of Pacific and 
Asian Studies, The Australian National University.
 2005   Australian Foreign Policy and the ramsi Intervention in Solomon 
Islands. The Contemporary Pacific 17:283–308.
438 the contemporary pacifi c • 19:2 (2007)
Keesing, Roger M
 1989   Creating the Past: Custom and Identity in the Contemporary Pacific. 
The Contemporary Pacific 1:19–42.
Knapman, Bruce, and Cedric D Saldanha
 1999   Reforms in the Pacific: An Assessment of the Asian Development 
Bank’s Assistance to Reform Programs in the Pacific. Manila: Asian 
Development Bank.
Larmour, Peter
 1998   Migdal in Melanesia. In Weak and Strong States in Asia-Pacific Socie-
ties, edited by Peter Dauvergne, 77–92. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
McDonald, Ross
 2003   Money Makes You Crazy: Custom and Change in the Solomon Islands. 
Dunedin, nz: University of Otago Press.
McDougall, Derek
 2002   Australia’s Peacekeeping Role in the Post-Cold War Era. Contempo-
rary Southeast Asia 24 (3): 590–608.
Migdal, Joel S
 1988   Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Moore, Clive
 2004   Happy Isles in Crisis: The Historical Causes for a Failing State in Solo-
mon Islands, 1998–2004. Canberra: Asia Pacific Press.
 2006   No More Walkabout Long Chinatown: Asian Involvement in Solomon 
Islands Economic and Political Processes. Paper presented at the “Sol-
omon Islands, Where to Now?” workshop, The Australian National 
University, Canberra, 5 May.
Morgan, Michael
 2005   Cultures of Dominance: Institutional and Cultural Influences on Par-
liamentary Politics in Melanesia. State, Society and Governance in Mel-
anesia Project Discussion Paper 2005/2. Canberra: Research School of 
Pacific and Asian Studies.
Morgan, Michael, and Abby McLeod
 2006   Have We Failed Our Neighbour? Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 60 (3): 412–428.
Nguyen, Minh
 2005   The Question of “Failed States”: Australia and the Notion of State Fail-
ure. Kings Cross, New South Wales, Australia: Uniya [ Jesuit Social Jus-
tice Center], March. http: // www.uniya.org / talks / nguyen_mar05.html 
[accessed 24 May 2005]
Oxfam Community Aid Abroad
 2003   Australian Intervention in the Solomons: Beyond Operation Helpem 
Fren; An Agenda for Development in the Solomon Islands. August. 
hameiri • the trouble with ramsi 439
 http: // www.caa.org.au / world / pacific /solomons /report.pdf [accessed 
29 August 2005]
pfnet / pina Nius
 2003   Solomon Islands: Failed State or Not Failed State? Pacific Maga-
zine, Online Edition, 29 October. http: // www.pacificislands.cc /pina /
pinadefault2.php?urlpinaid =9609 [accessed 24 August 2005]
Prasad, Satendra, and Darryn Snell
 2004   “The Sword of Justice”: South Pacific Trade Unions and ngos Dur-
ing a Decade of Lost Development. Development in Practice 14 (1/2): 
267–279.
ramsi, Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
 2004   ramsi Press Conference: ramsi’s Objectives for 2004. Australian Gov-
ernment Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 16 February. http://
www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2004/040116_ramsi.html [accessed 
27 August 2005]
Reilly, Benjamin
 2004   State Functioning and State Failure in the South Pacific. Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 58 (4): 479–493.
Robison, Richard, and Vedi Hadiz
 2004   Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age 
of Markets. New York: Routledge Curzon. 
Rodan, Garry, and Kanishka Jayasuriya
 2006   Conflict and the New Political Participation in Southeast Asia. Work-
ing Paper 129. Perth: Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University.
Rotberg, Robert I
 2003   Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators. In 
State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, edited by Robert 
I Rotberg, 1–28. Washington dc: Brookings Institution Press.
Roughan, John
 2003   National Recovery Plan . . . Misses the Point! Scoop Independent News, 
8 September . http: // www.scoop.co.nz/stories / H L0309 / S00056.htm 
[accessed 30 August 2005]
Roughan, Paul
 2004   National Integrity Systems, Transparency International Country Study 
Report: Solomon Islands 2004. Melbourne: Transparency International 
Australia and Asia Pacific School of Economics and Governance at the 
Australian National University.
Sanga, Kabini F
 2003   Solomon Islands Leadership: Tough Times and Tougher Acts. Future 
Times Journal 3:5–7.
Scales, Ian
 2003   Seizing the Policy Initiatives for Governance in Solomon Islands. Paper 
440 the contemporary pacifi c • 19:2 (2007)
presented at the “Solomon Islands Update: Crisis and Intervention” 
conference, The Australian National University, Canberra, 25 August.
Scales, Ian, Sinclair Dinnen, and David Hegarty
 2002   Governance at the Grassroots. Paper presented at the “Workshop on 
Participation Beyond the Centre in Solomon Islands,” The Australian 
National University, Canberra, 15–16 April.
Turnbull, Jane
 2002   Solomon Islands: Blending Traditional Power and Modern Structures 
in the State. Public Administration and Development 22:191–201.
Ulufa‘alu, Bartholomew
 2000   Beneath Guadalcanal: Serialised Public Statements from the Former 
Prime Minister. Policy and Structural Reform Programme of the Sol-
omon Islands Alliance for Change (siac) Former Government 1997–
2000. Solomon Islands Department of Commerce, Industries and 
Employment, February.  http: // www.commerce.gov.sb / Gov / siac.htm 
[accessed 4 October 2005]
Wainwright, Elsina
 2003   Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands. 
Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
Walters, Patrick
 2006   Race for Supremacy. The Australian, 20 April, 11.
Walters, Patrick and Cath Hart
 2006   Honiara Torched by Rioters. The Australian, 20 April, 1. 
Warner, Nick
 2004   Operation Helpem Fren: Rebuilding the Nation of Solomon Islands. 
Speech to National Security Conference by Nick Warner, ramsi Special 
Coordinator. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade. http: // www.dfat.gov.au / media /speeches /department /
040323_nsc_ramsi.html [accessed 23 August 2005]
Weber, Max
 1978   Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Abstract
While the debate that has followed the intervention by the Regional Assistance 
Mission to the Solomon Islands (ramsi) has centered on the suitability of the failed 
state label to Solomon Islands, I argue that this debate is misdirected because the 
concept of state failure itself is accepted uncritically. Examining what is meant 
by state failure is crucial, because (a) it has assumed an almost commonsensi-
cal mantle, which obscures its particular political and ideological underpinnings; 
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and (b) it has considerable conceptual limitations that render it a problematic 
framework for explaining the roots and possible trajectories of the confl ict in 
Solomon Islands. State failure is essentially a descriptive category with limited 
explanatory capacity, grounded in a depoliticized and ahistorical theorization of 
institutions, state, and society. At its core is an unhelpful preoccupation with 
state capacity as measured against a hypothetical legal-rational good-governance 
model. Confl icts are understood in this framework as the result of poor gover-
nance or recalcitrant social forces. ramsi, consequently, has sought to strengthen 
the institutional capacity of Solomon Islands as the key to confl ict resolution as 
well as a preventative long-term peace-building initiative. In contrast, I argue that 
unless we develop a clearer understanding of the causes and dynamics of confl ict, 
ramsi’s state-building approach is likely to exacerbate rather than alleviate ten-
sions in Solomon Islands. This approach involves a shift in emphasis away from 
the current fi xation on institutional capacity audits associated with the failed state 
concept, toward a more constructive theorization of the historically contingent 
relationship between changing patterns of economic development and social con-
fl ict.
keywords: Solomon Islands, failed state, ramsi, state capacity, confl ict, gover-
nance, patronage 
